



THE TAXATION OF BONDS OR STOCK OF FOREIGN
STATES, MUNICIPALITIES AND CORPORATIONS.
I. ARE bonds or obligations of other states, and of municipal
corporations incorporated by other states, commonly called the
stock or debt of such states and municipalities, subject to valuation
and assessment by the state in which the holder of such bonds or
obligations may reside?
The basis of our systems of state taxation is the fundamental
rule that every person in a state, or person holding property there-
in, ought to contribute his proportion of public taxes for the sup-.
port of the government, according to his actual worth in real and
personal property.
The principle, which must be deduced from this rule, is that im-,
movable properties within a state are subject to valuation and
assessment in such state, whether such property be owned by resi-
dents or non-residents; and that movable properties, owned by
residents of such state, follow the persons of their respective own-
ers, and must be accounted part of the property by which the
actual worth of such owners shall be measured.
This principle is a rule of public law: 2 Domat's Civil Law, by
Strahan, 2 ed. 330; Story Confl. Laws, 3 ed., §§ 379, 380, 381;
SMgl v. JForswik, 1 H. Black. 690; Preke v. Lord Carberr-y, Law
Rep. 16 Eq. Cas. 466, Lord SELBORNE.
The words "movable properties," used by the continental
writers, are now recognised as the fitting term by which to distin-
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guish those properties which follow the person, and are, therefore,
"movable" from those properties, which, though treated by a
local law as personal estate, are yet, as matter of fact, immovable,
because, being an interest in lands, "they savour of the realty."
Freke v. Lord Carberry, Law Rep. 16 Eq. Cas. 466, 467.
It certainly cannot be reasonably doubted that state and munici-
pal bonds, bearing interest, belong to the class of movable pro-
perties. "States and cities when they borrow money and con-
tract to repay it with interest, are not acting as sovereignties.
They come down to the level of ordinary individuals. Their con-
tracts have the same meaning as that of similar contracts between
private persons." Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S. 445. See
also U. S. Bank v. Planters' Bank, 9 Wheat. 907. Their obli-
gations are simply evidences of debt, due from such states and
cities to the holders of such obligations. Such bonds are, undoubt-
edly, property in the hands of those who hold and own them:
State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds, 15 Wall. 320. If they are
property in the hands of those who hold and own them, they have,.
as property, no other situs than the residence of such holders and
owners: State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds, 15 Wall. 323.
Such 'securities show the right of the persons owning them to
demand payment of the interest thereon, as it may accrue and
become payable, and of the principal, when it shall become due
according to the terms of the respective contracts: Williams on
Personal Property, 4th Am. ed. 4. These rights are properties
belonging to the owners of such securities: State Tax on Foreign-
held Bonds, 15 Wall. 320; Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S. 445.
They are properties, having a value in the market while the inter-
est is maturing and before the debts are due. They are proper-
ties, which, because they consist of the right of their respective
owners to demand such interest and principal, as they may respect-
ively become due, are personal to such owners; and have, as such
rights, no taxable situs, except the residences of their respective
owners: Cooley on Taxation 65; Burroughs on Taxation, sees.
41, 184, 482; Latrobe v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore,
19 Md. 22; Mayor and City Council of Bdltimore v. Sterling and
.Ridgely, 29 Md. 49; Champaign County Bank v. Smith, 7 Ohio
52, 54; Hall v. County Commissioners of Middlesex, 10 Allen
102 ; Webb v. Burlington, 28 Vt. 198 ;" Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 42
Conn. 426, 435.
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It does not matter that by the terms of tihe contracts the owner
of such securities is obliged to demand payment in a state other
than that in which he may reside. It does not matter that he is
required, by the terms of the contracts, to assign these securities
in a particular manner, or that the registry of such assignment is
required to be made or kept in a particular place. Such conditions
do not alter the situs of the right of property, or separate such
properties from the person of the owner of them. They are only
precautions, intended for the greater safety of the debtor: Black
v. Zacharie, 3 Howard 513; Farmers' Bankc of Al-aryland v.
I2glehart, 6 Gill 56; Baltimore City Passenger Railroad Co., v.
Sewell, 35 Md. 252, 253.
Such bonds may be securities, which are of record as the pro-
perty of the owner thereof, in the proper offices of the states and
corporations by which such bonds were executed; but the title to
the bonds does not depend upon the register only. Each of such
owners has actual possession of his bonds. Each of said owners is
competent to sell, bequeath, or give them away as part of his
estate. They are not subject, in any wise, to the taxing jurisdic-
tion of the states under whose authority they were issued, as the
property of such owners; because such owners are not within the
jurisdiction of those states: Hurray v. 0harleston, 96 U. S.
445. They are taxable only under the laws of the state in which
their owner may reside.
It is true that the Supreme Court, in the case of State Tax on
Foreign-held Bonds, 15 Wall. 323, 324, said: "That the actual
situs of personal property, which has a visible and tangible exist-
ence, and not the domicile of its owner, will, in many cases, deter-
mine the state in which it may be taxed. The same thing is true
of public securities, consisting of state bonds, and bonds of muni-
cipal bodies, and circulating notes of banking institutions; the
former, by general usage, have acquired the character of, and are
treated as, property in the place where they are found, though
removed from the domicile of the owner; the latter are treated and
pass as money wherever they are. But other personal property,
consisting of bonds, mortgages, and debts generally, has no situs
independent of the domicile of the owner."
We do not understand what is meant by the words that state
bonds, and bonds of municipal bodies, by general usage, "have
acquired the character of, and are treated as property, in the place
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where they are found, though removed from the domicile of the
owner."
It will be observed that the Supreme Court does not say that
such bonds are not to be treated as property, at the domicile of their
owner, when they are found at such domicile. It certainly did not
mean to say that they could be treated as property only in the state
or municipality by which such bonds were issued; for while in
Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S. 445, it decided that the -promise
of a state or municipality was property, it held on page 440, that
non-resident holder of such state or municipal promises, was not a
holder of property within such state or city. If such non-resident
holder of state or city bonds is not a holder of property in the state
or city issuing such bonds, he must certainly be accounted the
holder of such property at his domicile in the state in which he
resides. And, as the Supreme Court, in its opinion in Murray v.
Charleston, supra, expressly limits the taxing power of a state or
city over debts due by such state or city, to creditors within their
respective jurisdictions, it must certainly be understood to have
meant that the taxing power of other states, and of municipalities
in other states, extended to such properties, when owned by cred-
itors residing within their respective jurisdictions. In such cases
the property is found at the domiciles of the owners of the particu-
lar properties.
As a question of strict law, it is immaterial whether bonds,
issued by one state, or by a municipality incorporated by one state,
and owned by a resident of another state, were or were not exempt-
ed from taxation by the state which authoriz*ed the issue of such
bonds. Such exemption can have no extra-territorial operation,
except by general usage, or by a comity, which has attained the
force of general usage.
There is, of course, no need of any argument to show that the
bonds of other states, or of municipal or other corporations incor-
porated by other states, owned by residents of one state, are not
exempted from taxation by such state, because such bonds are not
taxed by the states which authorize their issue, when owned by
residents of such states. Each state is free, in the absence of a
constitutional provision to the contrary, to exempt from taxation
any class of property belonging to residents of such state to which
it may see proper to grant such immunity. The power thus exer-
cised can never operate beyond the jurisdiction of the state exer-
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cising it. No state can protect from taxation property within the
jurisdiction of another state, owned by a resident of such other
state.
II. Are shares of stock in corporations, other than municipal
corporations, not incorporated by the state in which the holder of
such shares resides, subject to valuation and assessment by the
state of which such holder is a resident?
A corporation, incorporated by another state, is a resident of
such state only: Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Peters 588;
Ohio and Mississippi Railroad Co. v. Wheeler, 1 Black 295-297;
and must be treated as a natural person would be, who resided in
such state: Louisville Railroad Co. v. Letson, 2 How. 555.
It is the sole owner of the franchises and capital of the corpora-
tion, and of the property, real, personal and mixed, in which that
capital is invested, and which are held in its corporate name and
by its corporate title ; and such property, according to its nature,
may be valued and assessed to the corporation owning it, in the
state in which such corporation resides, in the same manner in
which such particular properties would be assessed to individuals,
if they were the owners thereof: Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, 3
How. 150; Calcutta Tute Mills Co. v. Nicholson, Law Rep.
1 Ex. Div. 444, 448; Cesena Sulphur Co. v. Nicholson, Law
Rep. 1 Ex. Div. 453, 454.
If such corporation has a capital stock, divided into shares,
owned by individuals, such individual shareholders are not the
owners of any portion of the corporate property or franchise: Re-
gina v. Arnaud, 9 Ad. & E. N. S. 806, 817 (58 E. C. L. R. 816);
Watson v. Sp ratley, 10 Exch. 35, 238; Cesena Sulphur Co. v.
Nieholson, Law Rep. 1 Exch. Div. 451; and certainly the corpo-
ration is not the owner of the shares belonging to the individual
shareholders.
The shareholders have a right to participate in the net profits of
the corporation, as ascertained from time to time, in proportion to
the number of their shares in the corporate stock. They have a
right, in case of the dissolution of the corporation, to a share in its
assets remaining after payment of its debts, proportioned to their
ownership of its shares of stock. But, while the corporation re-
mains in being, they are not owners of any part of the corporate
franchises or property: MeCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 436;
.Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 700, 701; Gordon
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v. Appeal Tax Court, 3 Howard 150; Van Allen v. Assessors,
3 Wall. 584; Delaware Railroad Tax Case, 18 Wall. 229, 231;
-Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 686, 687, 691; Dewing v.
Perdicaries, 96 U. S. 196; Regina v. Arnaud, 9 Ad. & E. N.
S. 806, 817 (58 E. C. L. R. 816); Watson v. Spratey, 10 Exch.
235, 238. The right, while the corporation remains in being, to
receive their proportionate share of the net profits of such corpo-
ration, is their sole and exclusive right. It is not shared with the
corporation. It belongs to the stockholders as stockholders only.
This right is an actual property, having a market value, which,
whether it is to be termed a chose in action or not, is as much
the exclusive property of the shareholders as any other property
belonging to him. Ex parte Union Bank of Manchester, 12 Eq.
Cas. 357; Williams on Personal Property, 4th Am. ed. 6.
The property, owned by a shareholder in a corporation, is so dif-
ferent and distinct from the property owned by the corporation,
that its distinctive character is not affected by the nature of the
property of the corporation. The property of the corporation
may be wholly real estate. The shares of its stock are personal
property only: E parte Union Bank of Manchester, 12 Equity
Cases 357; Shelford on Joint Stock Companies, 2 Eng. ed. 147;
Myers v. Peregal, 2 De Gex, Mac. & Gord. 618, 621; Hilton v.
Giraud, 1 De Gex & Smale 83; Ashton v. Lord Langdale, 4
IDe Gex & Smale 402; Taylor v. Linley, 2 De Gex, Fisher &
Jones 84; ifayter v. Tucker, 4 .Kay & Johnson 243; SSarling
v. Parker, 9 Beav. 450; Walker v. Milne, 11 Beav. 507.
The necessary conclusion would seem to be that shares in a cor-
poration, incorporated by one state, owned by residents of another
state, constitute a separate and special property, belonging to the
respective shareholders, wholly distinct from the capital of the cor-
poration, and from the property in which that capital is invested:
EmorS v. State, 41 Md. 58.
The most complete proof that the property belonging to the
corporation, and the shares in such corporation in the hands of the
holders of such shares, are distinct and separate properties, is the
conclusion reached by the Supreme Court of the United States in
the recent case of Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 687, that
the property of a corporation and the shares of a corporation may
both be taxed in the hands of their respective owners, by the state
in which such corporation has its situs, and in which also such
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shareholders reside, and that such taxation is not double. In that
case it was declared to be "1 settled beyond doubt," that a tax upon
a corporation was a different thing from a tax upon the individual
shareholders of stock in the corporation; that the property of the
corporation, and the shares of stock of that corporation in the
hands of stockholders, were different properties, and were conse-
quently distinct subjects for taxation; and that an exemption of
the one was not of itself an exemption of the other, nor the taxa.
ation of the one a tax upon the other in such a sense as to inter-
fere with any exemption the latter might have from taxation.
The ruling, thus made, has been affirmed in the recent case of
-Dewing v. Perdicaries, 96 U. S. 196.
If shares of stock in a corporation, incorporated by a state,
owned by a shareholder residing in the same state, constitute a
property separate from that owned by the corporation, and are lia-
ble to taxation as the property of such shareholder, whether the
property of the corporation be taxed by such state, or not, it cer-
tainly follows that shares of stock in a corporation incorporated by
one state, are, when owned by a resident of another state, liable to
taxation by the state in which he resides, whether the property of
such non-resident corporation be taxed by the state in'which it has
its situs, or not: .Keyser v. Bice, 47 Md. 211, 212; Latrobe v.
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 19 Md. 13; Farrington v.
Tenneseee, 95 U. S. 686, 687, 691, 692; .lewing v. Perdicaries,
96 U. S. 196 ; Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 584 ; 1 Redf. Am.
R. W. Cases, Sup. 503, 504; State v. Branin, 3 Zab. 507; State
v. Bentley, 3 Zab. 341; Newark City Bank v. Assessors, 30 N. J.
20; Cooley on Taxation 15, 16, 274; Burroughs on Taxation
188; -Dwight v. Mayor of Boston, 12 Allen 316, 322; Howell v.
Cassapolis, 35 Mich. 472; City of Evansville v. Hall, 14 Indiana
27; Angel & Ames on Corp., 8th ed., sections 560-564.
When a corporation has its situs in one state, and the share-
holders of such corporation reside in another state, the taxation by
the one state of the corporate property, and by the other state of
the shares in that corporation, owned by persons residing in such
other state, is not a circumstance upon which the courts of either
state can found an objection. Such taxation cannot be objected to
as double taxation. The theory that taxation of the property of a
corporation, and also of its shares, is double taxation, has no appli-
cation except to a case where the situs of the property of such cor-
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poration, and the situs of the ownership of its shares of stock, are
both in one state, and both properties are taxed for the same object
and by the same authority in such state. Taxes, which are impos-
ed by different authorities, are not objectionable upon any theory
of double taxation, even if the taxes thus imposed affect the same
property. Municipal taxes are not unconstitutional, because they
affect property already taxed for state purposes. Federal direct
taxes, laid under article 1, section 8, of the Constitution of the
United States, would not be unconstitutional, although they would
certainly be imposed upon property already subject to state and
municipal taxation. Taxes imposed by different states, upon the
same property, could not be accounted double taxation. And cer-
tainly taxes imposed by different states upon properties different in
nature, however connected by relation to each other, cannot be
accounted double taxation.
The situs of the corporation does not determine the situs of the
shares of such corporation for the purposes of taxation. Such
shares represent only the right of the shareholder to receive an
aliquot portion of the net profits of the corporation; and -being
rights of property wholly personal to the shareholder, can have, as
property, no situs except the residence of such-shareholder. See
cases last cited.
The register of shares in the principal office of a corporation
does not create a situs for such shares as taxable property. That
book is only a record, kept for the security of the corporation, to
afford evidence of the ownership of such shares. A transfer upon
the registry is not necessary to divest the title of the owner of
shares of corporate stock. The property in such shares is so com-
pletely vested in the owner, that his transfer of them, by a proper
instrument, operates of itself to divest his title and to give to his
transferee a right to demand a new certificate: Bank v. Zacharie,
3 How. 513; Farmers' Bank v. Iglehart, 6 Gill 56; Baltimore
'ty Passenger Railway Co. v. Sewell, 35 Md. 252, 253 ; A4ri-
cultural Bank v. Burr, 24 Maine 254 ; Angell & Ames on Corp.,
8th ed., sect. 565. The register is only one of the irdioia of
title: Diwing v. Perdicaries, 96 U. S. 196.
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